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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
  
 In this consolidated appeal, we are asked to interpret 
the scope of a statutory tax exemption and to determine if, in 
enacting that exemption, Congress acted unconstitutionally.  
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For the reasons to be discussed, we will affirm. 
I. 
A. 
 Consolidated for our review in this appeal are three 
District Court actions, brought in the Eastern and Middle 
Districts of Pennsylvania and the District of New Jersey.  
Appellants in No. 13-2501 are Cape May County, New 
Jersey, and County Clerk Rita Marie Fulginiti.  Appellants in 
No. 13-2163 are Delaware and Chester Counties, 
Pennsylvania.  Appellant in No. 13-3175 is Evie Rafalko 
McNulty, Recorder of Deeds for Lackawanna County, 
Pennsylvania.  We will refer to these parties, collectively, as 
“Appellants.”  Appellees are the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“Fannie Mae” or “Fannie”), the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac” or “Freddie”), 
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (the “FHFA”).  For 
reasons that we will discuss, Appellees are identically situated 
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for purposes of this appeal.  We will therefore refer to them, 
collectively, as the “Enterprises.”  The United States was not 
involved in these cases at the district court level, but we 
granted its request for leave to intervene on appeal in the 
District of New Jersey and the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania cases, to defend the constitutionality of the tax 
exemptions at issue here.  The United States appears as 
amicus curiae with respect to the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania case. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are federally-chartered 
but privately owned corporations that issue publicly traded 
securities.  Congress created Fannie and Freddie to establish 
and stabilize secondary markets for residential mortgages in 
order to “promote access to mortgage credit throughout the 
Nation.”  12 U.S.C. § 1716 (Fannie Mae); see also 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1451 note (Freddie Mac).  Fannie and Freddie pursue their 
mission by purchasing mortgages from third-party lenders, 
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pooling them together and selling securities backed by those 
mortgages.  In the wake of the housing market collapse of 
2008, Fannie and Freddie found themselves owning a great 
many defaulted and overvalued subprime mortgages.  They 
went bankrupt, and on July 30, 2008, Congress created the 
FHFA to act as conservator for Fannie and Freddie.  “A 
conservatorship is like a receivership, except that a 
conservator, like a trustee in a reorganization under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, tries to return the bankrupt party 
to solvency, rather than liquidating it.”  DeKalb Cnty. v. Fed. 
Hous. Fin. Agency, 741 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(discussing the FHFA conservatorship in the context of a 
lawsuit identical to the instant appeal).  The FHFA is thus a 
party to this litigation in its role as conservator, but for 
purposes of our analysis, all three entities are identically 
situated. 
 Congress exempted the Enterprises from all state and 
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local taxation.  Fannie Mae‟s exemption statute states: 
[Fannie Mae], including its franchise, capital, 
reserves, surplus, mortgages or other security 
holdings, and income, shall be exempt from all 
taxation now or hereafter imposed by any State, 
. . . or by any county, . . .  except that any real 
property of the corporation shall be subject to 
State, territorial, county, municipal, or local 
taxation to the same extent as other real 
property is taxed. 
12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2).  Both Freddie Mac and the FHFA‟s 
exemption statutes are materially identical to Fannie‟s. 12 
U.S.C. § 1452(e) (Freddie Mac); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(2) 
(FHFA).  The Enterprises are thus exempt from “all taxation” 
by any state or local government, with the exception that they 
are still subject to taxes on real property.  
 Pennsylvania and New Jersey, like other states, tax the 
transfer of real estate.  In Pennsylvania, each “person who 
makes, executes, delivers, accepts or presents for recording 
any document” must pay a tax in the amount of one percent 
of the value of the real estate transferred.  72 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
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Ann. § 8102-C.  “Document” means “[a]ny deed, instrument 
or writing which conveys, transfers, devises, confirms or 
evidences any transfer or devise of title to real estate in this 
Commonwealth.”  Id. § 8101-C.  Pennsylvania also allows 
local authorities to impose real estate transfer taxes.  Id. § 
8101-D. 
 Similarly, New Jersey law requires the grantor of a 
deed to pay a fee to the county recording officer “at the time 
the deed is offered for recording.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:15-7a.  
The fee consists of “(a) a State portion at the rate of $1.25 for 
each $500.00 of consideration or fractional part thereof 
recited in the deed, and (b) a county portion at the rate of 
$0.50 for each $500.00 of consideration or fractional part 
thereof so recited.”  Id. § 46:15-7a(1).  Grantors must also 
pay a “supplemental fee” for each property conveyance or 
transfer.  Id. § 46:15-7.1. 
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B. 
 Delaware and Chester Counties filed an amended 
complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of 
themselves and a putative class of all similarly situated 
counties in Pennsylvania, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the Enterprises were not exempt from paying state and local 
real estate transfer taxes and a judgment awarding the 
proposed-class damages in the amount of the unpaid taxes.  
The Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss, which the District 
Court granted. 
 The District of New Jersey action proceeded similarly.  
Cape May County and its County Clerk filed an amended 
complaint on behalf of all New Jersey counties seeking 
declaratory relief and damages.  After hearing argument on a 
motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed the case. 
 Lackawanna County‟s Recorder of Deeds filed suit in 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, on behalf of herself and 
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a putative class consisting of all similarly situated 
Pennsylvania counties, municipalities, and state entities, 
seeking a declaration that the Enterprises were subject to state 
and local transfer taxes, money damages, and other relief.  
The District Court granted the Enterprises‟ motion to dismiss.  
The Middle District of Pennsylvania action differed slightly 
from the other two, in that the District Court did not consider 
the constitutionality of the exemptions, which is why the 
United States appears only as amicus curiae with respect to 
that case. 
 Appellants in each case timely appealed, and we 
consolidated the cases for appellate review.  
II. 
 The District Courts had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, because of the presence of a federal question.  
The District Courts also had jurisdiction pursuant to 12 
U.S.C. § 1452(f), which provides for original district court 
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jurisdiction over all civil actions to which Freddie Mac is a 
party “without regard to amount or value” “nowithstanding . . 
. any other provision of law.”  12 U.S.C. § 1452(f).  We have 
jurisdiction over the District Courts‟ final orders of dismissal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We apply “a plenary standard 
of review to issues of statutory interpretation, and to 
questions regarding a statute‟s constitutionality.” United 
States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
 Appellants present both statutory and constitutional 
challenges to the Enterprises‟ claimed tax exemptions.  As we 
will discuss in detail below, we disagree with their arguments. 
A. 
 “It is the cardinal canon of statutory interpretation that 
a court must begin with the statutory language.”  In re 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We presume that Congress expresses its intent 
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through the ordinary meaning of the words it uses.  Murphy v. 
Millennium Radio Group LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 
2011).  When that meaning is plain, our “sole function . . . – 
at least where the disposition required by the test is not absurd 
– is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.”  Id. 
(quoting Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 759 
(3d Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 The Enterprises are statutorily exempt from “all 
taxation” imposed by the states or their local subdivisions, 
with one notable exception – the states may tax the 
Enterprises‟ real property.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2) 
(Fannie Mae); id. § 1452(e) (Freddie Mac); id. § 4617(j)(2) 
(FHFA).  The Enterprises‟ charters do not define the words 
“all” or “taxation.”  “When words are left undefined, we have 
turned to „standard reference works such as legal and general 
dictionaries in order to ascertain‟ their ordinary meaning.”  
Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
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United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
“All” of something is the “whole amount or quantity of” it; it 
is “every member or individual component,” “the whole 
number or sum” of that thing.  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary, Unabridged 54 (1981).  “Taxation” 
is the act of imposing a tax, and a tax is “[a] charge 
. . . imposed by the government on persons, entities, 
transactions or property to yield public revenue” and, in its 
broadest sense, “embraces all governmental impositions on 
the person, property, privileges, occupations, and enjoyment 
of the people, and include[s] duties, imposts, and excises.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 1594, 1598 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis 
added).  Under the canon of statutory construction expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius (“the express mention of one thing 
excludes all others”), the solitary exception subjecting the 
Enterprises to real property taxation implies strongly that they 
are exempt from all other types of taxes.  See In re Federal-
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Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 The Enterprises‟ exemption from taxation is thus 
clearly expansive.  Fighting against such a capacious reading, 
Appellants urge that “all taxation” means something other 
than it says; that it is instead a term of art meaning only 
“direct” taxes.  There are only three types of direct taxes: 
capitations, also known as poll taxes, which are fixed taxes 
levied on people, see Black’s, supra, at 1596; taxes on real 
property; and taxes on personal property.  See Murphy v. 
I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  The transfer taxes 
are not direct taxes but rather are an excise tax, an indirect tax 
“imposed on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods.”  
Black’s, supra, at 646.  They tax the transfer of property, not 
the property itself. 
  In support of their argument, Appellants rely on the 
Supreme Court‟s decision in United States v. Wells Fargo 
Bank.  There, the Court interpreted a provision of the Housing 
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Act of 1937 that gave state and local housing authorities the 
power to issue tax-free financing instruments, termed “Project 
Notes.”  485 U.S. 351, 353 (1988); see also Hennepin Cnty. v. 
Fed’l Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1177 (D. 
Minn. 2013) (noting that the Project Notes were property 
issued by state and local housing authorities during the 
housing shortage of the 1930s), aff’d 742 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 
2014).  Congress had exempted the Project Notes “from all 
taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States.”  
Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. at 355.  Wells Fargo sought a refund 
of estate taxes paid on its Project Notes, arguing that the taxes 
fell within the ambit of “all taxation” from which the Notes 
were exempt.  Rejecting Wells Fargo‟s argument, the Court 
observed that “[f]or almost 50 years after the Act‟s passage, it 
was generally assumed that this exempted the Notes from 
federal income tax, but not from federal estate tax.”  Id. at 
353.  The Court understood as a background principle against 
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which the Housing Act was passed that “an exemption of 
property from all taxation had an understood meaning: the 
property was exempt from direct taxation, but certain 
privileges of ownership, such as the right to transfer the 
property, could be taxed.”  Id. at 355 (second emphasis in 
original).  In Appellants‟ view, the Supreme Court‟s exegesis 
of the meaning of “all taxation” in Wells Fargo controls our 
interpretation here. 
 The flaw in this argument, as both the Enterprises and 
the United States observe, is that Wells Fargo involved an 
exemption of specific property from all taxation, whereas this 
case involves exemptions of entities.  The estate tax that the 
Court considered in Wells Fargo was an excise tax on the 
transfer of property at death, and “transfer of the notes, as by 
bequest or sale, was not property and so could be taxed.”  
DeKalb County, 741 F.3d at 800 (emphasis omitted).  
Contrary to Appellants‟ argument, the distinction between a 
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property exemption and an entity exemption renders Wells 
Fargo inapposite. 
 Rather, our interpretation is guided by Federal Land 
Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 
(1941).  In Bismarck, the Supreme Court considered whether 
a provision of the Federal Farm Loan Act that exempted 
Federal Land Banks from paying state taxes included a state 
sales tax on property.  The relevant portion of the Farm Loan 
Act stated “[t]hat every Federal land bank . . . shall be exempt 
from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation.”  The 
Court determined that the “unqualified term „taxation‟ used in 
[the Farm Loan Act] clearly encompasses within its scope a 
sales tax such as the instant one.”  Id. at 99.   
 The exemption in Bismarck is materially identical to 
the Enterprise exemptions in two important ways.  First, in 
Bismarck, as here, the exemption applied to entities, not to 
specific property, unlike the exemption in Wells Fargo.  
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Second, like the transfer taxes at issue here, “a sales tax[] is 
an excise or privilege tax different in kind from a tax on 
property.”  Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169, 177 n.28 
(1969).  Both taxes are measured by reference to the value of 
the property involved in the transaction, and both are taxes on 
the privilege of transferring ownership of the property, not 
taxes on the property itself.   
 To date, three Courts of Appeals have considered and 
rejected Appellants‟ contention.  In DeKalb County, the 
Seventh Circuit observed that the Wells Fargo “Court was 
saying that an exemption from property taxes, such as a tax 
on project notes, is not an exemption from transfer taxes as 
well, because a transfer tax is not a property tax even when 
the transfer is of property.”  741 F.3d at 800.  “Had the 
Supreme Court meant to hold that the term „all taxation‟ 
means just property taxation – a very strange reading, 
equivalent to interpreting „all soup‟ to mean „all lobster 
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bisque‟ – it would have had to overrule [Bismarck]. . . . Wells 
Fargo does not even cite Bismarck.”  Id.  Similarly, in County 
of Oakland v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed the only court in the country to have agreed 
with Appellants‟ argument.  716 F.3d 935, 938 n.5 (6th Cir. 
2013), rev’g 871 F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. Mich. 2012).  The 
Sixth Circuit held that Bismarck controlled, and that 
Appellants‟ “argument would require us to stretch Wells 
Fargo beyond its clear language.”  Id. at 943.1  The Eighth 
Circuit has ruled likewise.  See Hennepin Cnty., 742 F.3d at 
                                              
1
 We also note the Sixth Circuit‟s observation that 
Appellants‟ argument would lead to absurd results.  As noted 
supra, there are only three types of direct taxes: capitations, 
and taxes on real and personal property.  “The transfer taxes 
here are clearly not capitations, and the statutes here 
separately provide an exclusion for taxes directly on real 
property . . .[;] the only direct tax remaining would be a tax 
on personal property.”  Id. at 943-44.  It would be absurd for 
Congress to “exempt [the Enterprises] from „all taxation‟ if it 
only meant they were exempt from personal property taxes. 
This cannot be correct and this conclusion is not supported by 
the plain language of the statute.”  Id. at 944. 
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822 (“We disagree with Hennepin County‟s argument that . . . 
[Wells Fargo] limited the meaning of „all taxation‟ in an 
exemption statute to mean only „all direct taxation‟”) (citation 
omitted; emphasis in original).
2
 
 Appellants‟ argument is fundamentally incompatible 
with the statutory text.  Accordingly, we will join our sister 
circuits, interpret the phrase “all taxation” to mean precisely 
what it says, and hold that the Enterprises are statutorily 
exempt from paying state and local real estate transfer taxes. 
B. 
 Before turning to Appellants‟ constitutional 
arguments, we pause briefly to consider their alternative 
                                              
2
 The Fourth Circuit has also rejected an attempt to 
force the Enterprises to pay real estate transfer taxes.  
However, the court in Montgomery County, Maryland v. 
Federal National Mortgage Association, did not consider the 
“all taxation” question.  Rather, it considered only whether 
the real estate transfer taxes fell into the real property carve-
out, and whether the Enterprises‟ exemptions were 
constitutional as applied to the transfer taxes.  See generally 
740 F.3d 914 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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statutory argument.  They contend that even if the transfer 
taxes fall within the scope of “all taxation,” the Enterprises 
are still not exempt because the transfer taxes fall within the 
exception for taxes on real property.  We disagree. 
 As we previously noted, the Enterprises‟ statutory 
exemption from all taxation contains a single exception – they 
are not exempt from state and local taxes on real property.  12 
U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(2) (Fannie Mae); id. § 1452(e) (Freddie 
Mac); id. § 4617(j)(2) (FHFA).  Appellants posit that the 
transfer taxes are effectively taxes on real property because 
under Pennsylvania law an owner cannot perfect an interest in 
real property until the deed is recorded and the transfer taxes 
paid. Appellants‟ Br. at 25.3 
 We reject this argument as foreclosed by both United 
States Supreme Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
                                              
3
 Appellants do not make a similar argument under 
New Jersey law. 
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precedent, and as manifestly contrary to the well-recognized 
difference between direct and indirect taxes (the very 
difference, indeed, that Appellants rely upon so heavily in 
their principal statutory argument).  In Wells Fargo, the 
Supreme Court recognized “the distinction between an excise 
tax, which is levied upon the use or transfer of property even 
though it might be measured by the property‟s value, and a 
tax levied on the property itself.”  485 U.S. at 355.  The 
Pennsylvania real estate transfer tax is an excise tax because 
it “is not a tax on the real estate itself . . . [but a] tax [on] 
certain transactions pertaining to real estate.”  Sablosky v. 
Messner, 372 Pa. 47, 50 (1952) (discussing a prior version of 
the Pennsylvania transfer tax).  
 Appellants attempt to blur this clear distinction by 
arguing that the transfer taxes amount to direct real property 
taxes because they are calculated by reference to the value of 
the property, and because failure to pay the tax can result in 
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the creation of a lien on the property.  We find neither 
contention persuasive.   With respect to the former, the 
Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Southern 
Railway Co. v. Watts, recognizing that “a privilege tax is not 
converted to a property tax because it is measured by the 
value of the property.”  260 U.S. 519, 530 (1923) (emphasis 
added).  With respect to the latter, the argument proves too 
much.  Under Pennsylvania law, an individual‟s failure to pay 
the transfer tax results in the creation of a lien in favor of the 
affected local government on all of the individual‟s property 
– both real and personal.  See 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8110-
D.  By Appellants‟ logic, then, the transfer tax is a direct tax 
on both real property and personal property.  To see the 
absurdity of this reading, one need only consider that the 
United States may place a lien on a delinquent taxpayer‟s 
home for failure to pay income taxes, but that does not 
transform the federal income tax into a tax on real property.  
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See 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (“If any person liable to pay any tax 
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . 
. . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all 
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, 
belonging to such person.”). 
 The transfer taxes are an excise tax, not a direct tax on 
real estate, and therefore are not within the scope of the 
exception.  Accord Montgomery Cnty., 740 F.3d at 919-21. 
C. 
 We turn now to Appellants‟ constitutional arguments.  
They offer two: first, that as applied to state and local real 
estate transfer taxes, the Enterprise exemptions exceed 
Congress‟s power under the Commerce Clause; and second, 
that by requiring state and local governments to record deed 
transfers at no cost, Congress has engaged in an 
unconstitutional commandeering under the Tenth 
Amendment.  We find neither argument persuasive.   But 
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before proceeding to the merits, we first consider Appellants‟ 
contention that we should review the constitutionality of the 
exemptions under heightened scrutiny. 
1. 
 Ordinarily, we review the constitutionality of social or 
economic legislation under a deferential rational basis 
standard of review.  See Brian B. ex rel. Lois B. v. Commw. of 
Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 586 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Appellants, however, argue that we should depart from that 
practice and apply some (undefined) manner of heightened 
scrutiny to the exemptions because they place a burden on the 
ability of the states to collect taxes.  We are not persuaded by 
Appellants‟ argument. 
 The Supremacy Clause provides that the laws of the 
United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI., cl. 2.  Where state and 
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federal laws conflict, the state law is “without effect.”  
Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, --- U.S. ---, 133 S. Ct. 
2466, 2472-73 (2013).  Appellants‟ assertion that a state‟s 
taxing authority “stands on equal footing with” Congress‟s 
power under the Commerce Clause, see Appellants‟ Br. at 30, 
was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court nearly 200 years 
ago: 
It has been contended, that this construction of 
the power to regulate commerce, as was 
contended in construing the prohibition to lay 
duties on imports, would abridge the 
acknowledged power of a State to tax its own 
citizens, or their property within its territory.  
We admit this power to be sacred; but cannot 
admit that it may be used so as to obstruct the 
free course of a power given to Congress. We 
cannot admit, that it may be used so as to 
obstruct or defeat the power to regulate 
commerce. It has been observed, that the 
powers remaining with the States may be so 
exercised as to come in conflict with those 
vested in Congress. When this happens, that 
which is not supreme must yield to that which is 
supreme. . . . It results, necessarily, from this 
principle, that the taxing power of the States 
must have some limits. It cannot reach and 
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restrain the action of the national government 
within its proper sphere. . . . It cannot interfere 
with any regulation of commerce. 
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448-49 (1827) 
(Marshall, C.J.) (paragraph break omitted; emphasis added); 
see also DeKalb County, 741 F.3d at 801 (rejecting the 
argument pressed here by Appellants as foreclosed by Brown 
and “an unbroken line of decisions since”).  More recent 
precedent confirms that Congress may constitutionally 
supersede state tax laws as a rational part of an interstate 
regulatory regime.  See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ga. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 552 U.S. 9, 20-22 (2007) (recognizing 
that a federal statute prohibits states from imposing certain 
taxes on railroads); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 376 
(1986) (holding that a federal environmental statute 
preempted New Jersey‟s ability to impose certain taxes); Ariz. 
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 149-50 (1979) 
(holding that, because “Congress had a rational basis” for 
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finding that a state tax interfered with interstate commerce, it 
was within the power of Congress to “select[] a reasonable 
method to eliminate that interference”).  As Judge Posner 
succinctly stated, “[n]o provision of the Constitution insulates 
state taxes from federal powers granted by the Constitution, 
which include of course the power of Congress „to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States‟. . . .”  DeKalb County, 741 F.3d at 801 (quoting U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).  
 It is true, as Appellants suggest, that the Supreme 
Court has respected the authority to tax as a critical 
component of state sovereignty.  But the Court has 
manifested that respect not by placing state taxation power on 
an equal constitutional plane with Congress‟s commerce 
power (or any other enumerated power), but by requiring that 
Congress speak clearly when it intends to exercise its lawful 
authority under the Supremacy Clause to preempt traditional 
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state powers.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Rev. of Or. v. ACF Indus., 
Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994) (“When determining the 
breadth of a federal statute that impinges upon or pre-empts 
the States‟ traditional powers, we are hesitant to extend the 
statute beyond its evident scope.  We will interpret a statute to 
pre-empt the traditional state powers only if that result is „the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‟” (citations 
omitted)).  Our general reluctance to hold traditional state 
powers preempted is an interpretive principle that guides how 
we construe statutes, not a heightened constitutional standard 
of review.  Accordingly, we review Congress‟s action here 
under the rational basis standard of review. 
2. 
 Our national Government is one of enumerated 
powers, and accordingly “[e]very law enacted by Congress 
must be based on one or more of those powers.”  United 
States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010) (quoting United 
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States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Congress has the power to 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States . . . .”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Through the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can exercise its 
commerce authority by “enact[ing] laws that are „convenient, 
or useful‟ or „conducive‟ to the authority‟s „beneficial 
exercise.‟”  Comstock, 560 U.S. at 133-34.   “„Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and 
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.‟”  Id. at 134 
(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819)).  
Put simply, a statute is “Necessary and Proper” if it 
“constitutes a means that is rationally related to the 
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  Id. 
(citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004)). 
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 The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate 
“the channels of interstate commerce, persons or things in 
interstate commerce, and those activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.”  Nat. Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (quoting Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 609) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
case implicates Congress‟s power to regulate those activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce, a power that 
“can be expansive.”  Id.  The Supreme Court has “firmly 
establishe[d]” that Congress has the authority under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate activities purely local in nature, 
so long as they form “part of an economic „class of activities‟ 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 In evaluating whether a statute is valid under the 
Commerce Clause, our “task . . . is a modest one.”  Id. at 22.  
We need only determine whether Congress had a rational 
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basis for determining that the regulated activity, in the 
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.  Id. 
(citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Hodel, 
452 U.S. at 276-80; Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 
155-56 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-
301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964)).  “That the regulation ensnares 
some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.”  Id. 
 Congress created the Enterprises to establish and 
stabilize a nationwide secondary market in home mortgages 
and to increase the supply of mortgage lending capital.  See 
12 U.S.C. § 1716 (Fannie Mae); id. § 1451 note (Freddie 
Mac).  Fannie and Freddie both were “tasked by Congress 
with buying mortgages from banks that had made mortgage 
loans, thus pumping money into the banking industry that 
could be used to make more such loans.”  DeKalb County, 
741 F.3d at 797.  Congress could rationally have believed that 
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exempting the Enterprises from the burden of state and local 
taxation would allow them to more efficiently pursue their 
directives.  Reducing the transaction costs that the Enterprises 
incur in the course of buying and selling mortgages would 
free up liquidity to purchase more of them.  And the savings 
are not inconsequential.  The Delaware County Appellants 
alleged that for the fiscal year ending in June 2011, the state 
of Pennsylvania collected over $279 million in real estate 
transfer taxes.  Although Appellants have not alleged a dollar 
amount that Fannie and Freddie failed to pay, it can hardly be 
gainsaid that it is a substantial sum.  It strains credulity to 
argue that the transfer taxes, aggregated nationally, do not 
substantially affect “the home mortgage market[, which] is 
nationwide, and indeed worldwide, with home mortgages 
being traded in vast quantities across state lines.”  Id. at 11.   
 Appellants cite Lopez and Morrison in an effort to 
show that Congress here exceeded the bounds of the 
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Commerce Clause by seeking to regulate purely local activity, 
but neither case advances their argument.  In Lopez, the Court 
struck down a federal statute making it a crime to possess a 
firearm in a school zone.  514 U.S. at 551.  Recognizing first 
that it had “upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts 
regulating intrastate economic activity” that substantially 
affected interstate commerce, the Court held the statute 
unconstitutional because “by its terms [it] has nothing to do 
with „commerce‟ or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms.”  Id. at 561.  By the 
same token, the Morrison Court struck down a statute 
creating a civil damages remedy under the Violence Against 
Women Act because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence 
are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”  528 
U.S. at 613.  The lesson to be drawn from Lopez and 
Morrison is that whether the activity is economic in nature is 
central to our analysis: “Where economic activity 
 41 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Id. at 610 (quoting 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 Appellants attempt to shift the analysis away from the 
obviously economic nature of the secondary mortgage market 
by arguing that the collection of taxes is not economic 
activity but rather “[t]he sovereign right of states.”  
Appellants‟ Br. at 34.  We find this argument unpersuasive.  
The transfer tax exemptions aid the Enterprises in regulating 
the secondary mortgage market, which is clearly of an 
economic nature.  As previously discussed, considerations of 
state sovereignty yield under the Supremacy Clause.  
Appellants simply have no support for the notion that 
congressional preemption of state taxation as a rational part of 
an interstate regulatory regime is verboten.  Accordingly, we 
hold that Congress acted well within the bounds of the 
Commerce Clause when it exempted the Enterprises from 
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paying state and local real estate transfer taxes.
4
 
3. 
 In a single paragraph appended to their Commerce 
Clause argument, Appellants contend that by requiring state 
and local governments to register deed transfers involving the 
Enterprises at no cost, Congress has violated the anti-
commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.  This 
argument is frivolous.  
 Only two Supreme Court cases have found a federal 
statute to unlawfully commandeer state government actors.  
                                              
4
 The parties debated at some length in their briefs 
whether the Enterprises are federal instrumentalities for 
purposes of tax immunity and whether it was necessary for us 
to reach that question.  It is, of course, axiomatic that the 
States may not tax an organ of the federal government.  See 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436-37 (1819).  
However, because we find that Congress acted 
constitutionally in extending statutory tax immunity to the 
Enterprises, we need not reach the question of whether they 
are also entitled to constitutional immunity as 
instrumentalities of the United States.  See First Agric. Nat’l 
Bank of Berkshire Cnty. v. State Tax Comm’n, 392 U.S. 339, 
340-41, 345 (1968).   
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In Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
federal statute requiring state and local law enforcement 
officers to perform background checks on prospective 
handgun purchasers, holding that the Tenth Amendment 
precludes Congress from commanding state executive 
officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory scheme.  
521 U.S. 898, 904, 932-33 (1997).  In New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149-54 (1992), the Court considered a 
federal regulatory regime involving the disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste by the states.  One aspect of the regime 
required states to take title to the waste if they had not 
arranged for disposal by a specified date.  Id.  The Court 
struck that provision down because it required states either to 
enact a regulatory regime of their own, or expend resources in 
taking title to the radioactive waste.  Id. at 176.  Neither case 
bears the slightest resemblance to the situation before us. 
 The Enterprise exemptions do not run afoul of Printz 
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or New York for the simple reason that they do not “issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, 
nor command the States‟ officers . . . to administer or enforce 
a federal regulatory program.”  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 229 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 935) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The anti-commandeering principle does not 
“suspend[] the operation of the Supremacy Clause on 
otherwise valid laws.”  Id. at 230.  Rather than impose an 
affirmative obligation on state or local officials, the 
exemptions simply preclude them from imposing the transfer 
taxes on the Enterprises.  A state official‟s compliance with 
federal law and non-enforcement of a preempted state law – 
as required by the Supremacy Clause – is not an 
unconstitutional commandeering.   
IV. 
 We conclude that the statutory language “all taxation” 
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includes within its scope state and local real estate transfer 
taxes and that the carve-out for real property taxation does not 
apply to the transfer taxes.  We further hold that Congress 
was within its constitutional authority to grant the Enterprises 
such immunity.  Our decision is in accord with each Court of 
Appeals to have addressed these issues.  The orders of the 
District Courts dismissing Appellants‟ complaints are 
affirmed. 
